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We introduce opportunities for pre-play communication and to enter 
binding or non-binding contracts in trust games, and find (a) 
communication increases trusting and trustworthiness, (b) contracts 
are unnecessary for trusting and trustworthy behaviors and are 
eschewed by many players, (c) more trusting leads to higher 
earnings, and (d) both trustors and trustees favor “fair and efficient” 
proposals over the unequal proposals predicted by theory. 
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1. Trust, Communication and Contracts 
The trust or investment game of Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995), gives two 
randomly assigned subjects endowments of 10 units, letting A send none, any or all of her 
10 to B, tripling the amount sent, and letting B send none, any or all of the amount 
received back to A.  The conventional economic prediction for this game is that A sends 
nothing since B would return nothing received.  
In laboratory experiments, pre-play communication has been a powerful way of 
increasing cooperation (Ledyard, 1995; Sally, 1995).  But two-way pre-play 
communication has yet to be made available to trust-game participants.
1  We let subjects 
play trust games with pre-play numerical proposals sometimes preceded by chat room 
communication. We also gave our subjects opportunities to enter into costly binding and 
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non-binding contracts to investigate when subjects prefer trust over contracts, and to what 
effect (see Bohnet, Frey and Huck 2001 and Andreoni 2005 for related work). 
 
2. Design and Predictions 
Subjects were assigned to a room with typically 15-20 others with whom no 
communication was permitted, and were matched for each of a series of interactions with 
a new anonymous partner seated in a similar room in a different building.
2  Endowments 
and payouts were in units called experimental dollars (E$), which converted to real 
dollars at the rate E$1 = $0.14 at the end of the session, generating average earnings of 
$28.25.  Four consecutive interactions are analyzed here.
3  
To facilitate communication of proposals and counterproposals, subjects were 
shown Figure 1, in which each row heading lists an amount that could be sent by A and 
each column heading lists a proportion of the amount received that could be returned by 
B (0, 1/6, 1/3, etc.). To make sure that subjects understood the implications of their 
choices for payouts, the table’s cells list both the amount that B sends A and the implied 
payouts to A and B, including B’s $10 endowment (which B always retains). In their first 
interaction, subjects played a standard trust game, using the Figure 1 interaction table to 
register choices. In the second, new partner, interaction, each subject could make one pre-
play proposal, with A first proposing (by clicking and highlighting) both a row and a 
column, then B proposing a row and column.  
Subjects’ third interactions resembled the second except that up to three proposals 
and counterproposals could be sent by each A and B, with the proposal stage ending 
either when two consecutive proposals were identical or following B’s third proposal.  
Subjects’ fourth interactions were like the second except that before exchanging 
numerical proposals they could exchange text messages for four minutes in private chat 
rooms, with prohibitions on disclosing their names and on making threats about actions to 
be carried out after the experiment (on penalty of forfeiting all payments). 
In interactions 2, 3 and 4, subjects who reached agreement (clicked on the same 
proposal) were asked if they wanted a costly contract.  If both said yes, they were asked if 
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they wanted a contract with (binding) penalties.  Subjects learned whether a contract had 
been agreed to, but were not specifically told the reply of their counterpart.  Payout-
determining choices by A and B followed exchange of proposals and (in cases of 
agreement) choice of contract.  A contract without penalties cost each party E$1 or E$2, 
depending on the experiment session, while one with penalties (equaling 110% of any 
stipulated amount not sent) cost each twice that amount (E$2 or E$4).  
An example of exchanges for a session of the experiment including screen shots is 
at http://webpages.csom.umn.edu/hrir/abenner/web/papers/ep/ep-01.pdf.  
 
Predictions  
Absent a binding contract, under the conventional assumption that subjects are 
rational payoff maximizers who know their counterparts to be of the same type, B should 
send no money to A regardless of how much he receives, and understanding this A should 
send nothing to B.  A and B thus keep their initial endowments and earn E$10.  
Furthermore, (a) ability to make proposals, no matter how many, (b) concurring on the 
same proposal, (c) entering a contract without penalties, and (d) exchanging text 
messages, should make no difference. Only a binding contract can lead to positive 
sending and returning by A and B.  The unambiguous prediction is that A should make a 
proposal that maximizes her surplus while giving B a little over his fallback.
4 With the 
restriction of B’s return proportion to multiples of 1/6, the prediction is that A  proposes a 
contract-with-penalties in which A sends E$10 and B returns E$25, which gives net 
earnings after contract costs of E$1 or E$2 per player of either (E$24, E$14) or (E$23, 
E$13). Since the interaction is otherwise sure to yield only E$10, a rational payoff-
maximizing B will accept this proposal, and both will proceed to select a contract in 
general and a contract-with-penalties in particular.   
Behavioral economics, in contrast, suggests that some, perhaps most, people keep 
their promises, reciprocate, trust others’ promises, and believe that there are many other 
people are like them (Sobel 2005). It predicts some positive sending and returning in 
interaction 1, presence of efficient and fair proposals and interactions, real effects of 
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communication, at least occasional decisions to forego available contracts, and possible 
real effects of non-binding contracts.
5 
 
3. Results   
Table 1 summarizes behaviors and payoffs in each of the four interactions.  It 
shows that cooperation between A’s and B’s was on average smallest in the first 
interaction; that cooperation was higher in the two interactions allowing proposals but not 
verbal messages; and that cooperation was highest in the interaction with chat.  Behavior 
by  B’s does not seem to differ as much across the first three interactions, with the 
proportion returned being around 46%, but B’s average return proportion jumps to 59% 
after chat.  We find that 12.6% of interactions 2 – 4 were without agreement, 71.8% with 
agreement but no contract, 9.5% with a non-binding contract, and 6.1% with a binding 
contract, contradicting the prediction that all would select binding contracts.  
In Table 2 we investigate the statistical significance of the methods of 
communicating using GLS regressions (including individual fixed effects).
6  We also 
examine the impact of reaching agreement, taking possible endogeneity into account by 
controlling for proposal terms.  The first two regressions show that A’s both sent and 
earned significantly more in interactions with chat and when their counterpart agreed to 
their proposal.
7,8  The last two regressions suggest that B’s sent more and thus earned less 
when they agreed to A’s proposal, and when they engaged in chat with their counterpart, 
while multiple proposals had the opposite effect on proportion returned.  In sum, many 
B’s act as if committed to their agreements, especially if they have chatted.
9  Further 
analysis of the data shows that A’s who sent more earned significantly more (trust paid 
off), that A’s sent and B’s returned more with non-binding contracts than with agreement 
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but no contract, and that chat significantly increased sending and returning conditional on 
agreement and controlling for choice of contract.
10   
Contrary to the prediction that A’s would propose and B’s accept exchanges 
giving a disproportionate share of the total returns to A, in actuality A’s first proposal was 
the “fair and efficient” exchange in which A and B split equally the maximum earnings 
79.6% of the time, and such proposals were agreed to 96.2% of the times when they were 
made, versus 53.3% of the time on average for other proposals.
11 Sending by A and 
returning by B equaled or exceeded the proposed levels 66.24% of the time when they 
were fair and efficient, versus 41.67% of the time when not.  
 
4. Conclusions 
Trusting was significantly increased in our experiment by opportunities to 
exchange proposals and counterproposals, and trustworthiness was increased and trusting 
further increased when verbal messages could also be sent. The modal agreement was to 
the most equitable of the efficient sets of actions, and such agreements were carried out 
by both parties significantly more often than were other agreements. Trust “paid off” 
under all conditions in our experiment, with more trusting seeming to engender more 
trustworthiness. 
We provided the first laboratory illustration of the familiar proposition that the 
presence of trust can save on transactions costs: a great deal of mutually profitable 
trusting and trustworthiness took place without contracts even though the alternative of 
costly contracts was available, and many individuals were able to commit themselves to 
courses of action that were not ex post materially profitable, contrary to the assumption of 
standard theory.  The large majority of instances of trusting and trustworthiness in those 
interactions in which contracts could be opted for took place without contracts.  
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Table 1.  Average outcomes by interaction 
 
B sends
3  Interaction 
Type 
 
















Simple (1)  5.47 (3.16)
 1  11.52 (5.71)  0.42 (0.26)    7.45 (6.86)  19.42 (7.97) 
One  proposal (2)  7.69 (3.42)  13.89 (6.44)  0.49 (0.26)  12.70 (8.15)  20.86 (7.64) 
≤ three proposals (3)  8.06 (3.28)  13.18 (7.41)  0.46 (0.28)  12.60 (8.57)  22.37 (8.68) 
Chat + one proposal 
(4) 
9.20 (2.47)  16.63 (6.26)  0.59 (0.22)  17.18 (6.77)  20.96 (6.65) 
 
Notes:  
1 Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.  
2 Earnings after deduction of contract costs, where applicable. 
3 Refers to cases in which A sends positive amount. 
4 After tripling A’s sending. 
5 Includes cases in which A sends zero. 
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Table 2. Effects of agreement, communication type, and proposal terms 
 
Dependent Variable 















































Interaction 3 dummy 










Interaction 4 dummy 










#  obs.  294 294 275 275 
 
Wald χ
2  352.61 180.33 166.63 176.27 
 
Prob. > χ
2  <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
 
Notes. GLS regressions.  Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. All estimates include 
individual fixed effects.  *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. B’s sending and payoff are contingent on A’s sending more than 0.   + In multiple-
proposal interactions, A’s final proposals. 
 